History exposes how U.S. troubled water in the South China Sea

Anthony Carty, a British scholar on international law, discovered that western history supports China’s sovereignty over the disputed islands in the South China Sea after conducting rigorous research on the national archives from Britain, France and the United States. 

In this episode of China Trends, Professor Carty has shared his insights on the South China Sea with our host, Tom Pauken II.

Transcript

Pauken II.:

Hello and welcome to this edition of China Trends, I am your host Tom Pauken II. here in Beijing.  

In April, the U.S., Japan and the Philippines convened a trilateral summit in Washington, which is seen as a move to incite conflicts in the South China Sea amid flaring tensions. 

Accordingly, the South China Sea issue has captured the world’s attention yet again. 

The South China Sea topic deals with a combination of history and sovereignty over certain islands. What historical evidences show proof for who owns the islands? 

And let’s give a note to our viewers: The islands we are referencing are the Spratly’s, which is called Nansha Qundao in China and the Paracell Islands are known in China as Xisha Qundao. For the remainder of our show, we will use the words: Nansha Qundao and Xisha Qundao. 

So, let’s dive deeper into the South China Sea issue at greater length.  

Today, I’m so delighted to interview the author of the book, The History and Sovereignty of South China Sea. He is Professor Anthony Carty, who is recognized as a world renown expert on international law.   

Pauken II.:
Hello, Professor Carty. Thanks for joining us for today's show.  

Carty:
It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you for inviting me. Thank you for inviting. 

Pauken II.:
Why did you decide to write a book about the South China Sea issue?  

Carty:
Well, it's a long story and it didn't start as a book. I came from Britain to Hong Kong in 2009 to be a professor of public law and essentially also international law at Hong Kong University. At that time, the disputes in the South China Sea flared up with the coming with the claims being made by the Philippines and Vietnam to vast economic zones in the South China Sea. 

And at that point, China reacted and responded by saying that it had sovereignty over the Xisha (Qundao) and Nansha Islands (Qundao). And I thought well it's my responsibility as an international lawyer to see whether I could carry the matter any further. 

And while in Britain, I had written，with an English colleague, a 600-page book on the role of the legal advisers in the British government in the Interwar Period. And, so I thought that the British archives could possibly have thrown some light on this. 

 And the Foreign Ministry in Britain, in my opinion, certainly at this time, was an extremely professional entity with several hundred years of history. And they have a vast historical department of fully trained historians who then archive all the materials on particular questions. And so they presented a very large historical archival collection to the legal department to ask some comments. And that helped the government to have an idea of what position to take up, if any, in the considerable unrest going on.  

Britain had a clear position on the Paracell, or Xisha Islands (Qundao) from right back to the 1930s, the 1920s when they were formerly claimed by the Qing Empire (Dynasty) in 1909. This Spratly (Nansha Qundao) question, this was an internal discussion within the Ministry after close consultation with the French Foreign Ministry. 

 And after consultation with the French, they decided that as a legal matter, these Spratly Islands (Nansha Qundao) were Chinese and based on the records that they had collected about their own conduct and the conduct of the French and other countries since the 1890s. 

I think that China can reasonably challenge the British government that the institutional memory of a very professional foreign ministry, for which they should duly be proud, because of its professionalism, does indicate clearly that, without any need for arbitration or any need for negotiation, that is the Spratly, or Nansha Islands (Qundao) are Chinese as an archipelago.  

Pauken II.:
 Can you tell us about the major findings from the archives that you uncovered from Britain, France, and the United States?  

Carty:
This is a very complicated and long question. The documents themselves are left to stand in part of a very complex and continuing chronology. The document I've already referred to in 1974, I think, is the most exhaustive and systematic review done in a virtually academic way. And it is based on a historical archive, and it considers the claims of the Philippines, of Vietnam, and of China. And it decides, in the case of the Spratly Islands (Nansha Qundao), that the Spratly Islands  (Nansha Qundao) are Chinese. 

 Well, there's a series of documents coming from the American archives, which are very relevant to the present controversy, where in 1960s,  deputy undersecretary of the State Department, for East Asia, he said, in a record, which is available in the State Department archives that were open when I visited them in Maryland, that the United States has never taken any position on the Filipino claim to the South China Sea, but it could be in the strategic interests of the United States to encourage the Philippines to make a claim. And this constitutes very well with the joint chiefs of staff  informing John Foster Dulles, that under no circumstances should America tolerate the South China Sea islands (Nanhai Zhudao) coming back into the hands of the Chinese that would not be an American strategic interest.  

Pauken II.:
So in April, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines, held a trilateral meeting in Washington, and they, once again, mentioned the decision of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal. Can you tell our viewers what the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal was?  

Carty: 
Well, it was a case brought by the Philippines against China, that it claimed its ownership of the islands of the South China Sea of the Spratly, or the Nansha (Qundao) as an archipelago. And at the same time, which would have some maritime entitlement. But at the same time, they claimed, more importantly, an economic zone going out from the Filipino archipelago mainland. The arbitrators took the issue very much into their own hands, and they decided contrary to what had been the traditional opinion of Vietnam, and the Philippines, as much as China.  

Pauken II. :
Ok, so what's the meaning of that?  

Carty:
 Well, the meaning of that is a kind of humpty dumpty. 

So the rationale of the (United Nations) Convention (on the Law of the Sea) in their view was that these very tiny islands should not obstruct the claims of the archipelago of the Philippines and of Vietnam. However, the manner in which they interpreted the document is contrary to the literal and scientific geographical description of the article. The article provides in 121(2), paragraph 121(2) that islands have the same maritime entitlements as the mainland of a country. And these  have always been understood to be islands. And so the interpretation of these islands as rocks is geologically not correct. All of this is made up by the tribunal and raises questions about the integrity of the tribunal. And I think it is certainly unprofessional.  

Pauken II:
Sure. The Chinese government does not recognize the tribunals ruling. Can you tell me why ? 

Carty:
I mean normally, maritime delimitation under the convention is a matter of agreement between the parties to have boundaries that touch upon one another. So it would be up to the government of China and the Philippines to draw a maritime boundary. 

What the tribunal has done is a trick. They've decided that the China has no presence in the South China Sea, because the Nansha Islands (Qundao) are not islands for the purposes of the Convention, as I've said, that is not a geologically or grammatically credible interpretation of Articles 121(2)  and 121(3).  

I mean the United States is not a party to the law of the sea convention. It has not prepared itself to submit to any international tribunal where its own national interests are involved. It has defied and ignored the International Court of Justice repeatedly. So emotions are very high when you find major powers, building alliances against China, arguing that China is not observing international law and not submitting to international adjudication when the United States itself has never been willing to do so. 

Pauken II.:
In your opinion, what are the real motives for the three party summit of the U.S., Japan and the Philippines?  

Carty:
I think I've said enough about the American. （That's okay）. I'm shocked of what I take to be the cynicism of the Japanese Liberal Democratic government that I think they see this as an opportunity to completely rearm and militarize Japan by stoking up the pretext that of Chinese aggression because of its desire to acquire sovereignty over the South China Sea islands (Nanhai Zhudao).  

Pauken II.:
I definitely agree. The United States, a country from outside of the region, has shown a strong interest in the South China Sea issue. Why？ 

Carty:
Well, I looked through the archives of John Foster Dulles, which are part of the archives of Eisenhower in Princeton University. I came across a record of a conversation between  the American General MacArthur and George Kennan, the author of the Russian doctrine of containment, and they agreed basically on George Kennan's initiative, that the western boundary of the United States had to be the eastern coastline of China. It is actually, if you look again in the work of the leading and very brilliant and lucid American historian John Gaddis, it is an American doctrine since the beginning of the 19th century that it is a preeminent power, that it must have predominance and preeminence over all other countries, and that therefore, gradually, by the beginning of the 20th century, it has expanded its Monroe Doctrine to mean that it has to be preeminent in every part of the globe. 

 So that strategy in East Asia is to prevent any other major power from reaching preeminence. It is the reason for its hostility towards China. In the Middle East, it's the reason for its hostility towards Iran. And in eastern Europe is hostility towards Russia. It is a sense of itself as a global power.  

Pauken II.:
 From your perspective, how can all relevant parties properly manage and resolve disputes on the South China Sea issue?  

Carty: 
There is no immediate solution. The basic problem is the abortive peace conference of San Francisco. Basically, the Americans have deliberately for their own strategic reasons, failed following the war with Japan to call a genuine and valid international peace conference in which all the territorial issues arising out of Japanese aggression could be wrapped up and resolved by mutual agreement together. 

 And basically, it has to be taken as a whole. What the Americans are doing at the moment, in my view, merits very very strong language of condemnation. They are demonizing China and trying to build up an alliance of all of these countries with unsettled boundaries. Boundaries are unsettled because of the United States’ decision to leave them unsettled in order for America to satisfy its vanity and its insecurities in relation to China. 

Pauken II.: 

Well, thank you, Professor Carty. 

So let's conclude our episode. 

Thank you for watching. 

I'm your host Tom Pauken II. , and I will see you next time.